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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------------
'1'111 f"l.ANNINC;, INC., 
111 -·1rµnrat inn, 
Plaint1fE-Appellant, 
No. 18968 
vs. 
llANK OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff-appellant, Research 
Planning, Inc., against defendant-respondent, Bank of Utah, 
wherein plaintiff claimed that defendant paid checks drawn 
against one of its depositor's general checking accounts with 
knowledge that the depositor was misappropriating funds held by 
the depositor as a fiduciary, or that checks were paid by defen-
rlant from said depositor's account with sufficient information 
that its actions in paying said checks constituted bad faith 
under Utah Code Annotated §22-1-9, The Bank of Utah defended the 
artion on the basis that the evidence did not support the claim 
that it either had actual knowledge of misappropriation or that 
1t acted in bad faith. The Bank of Utah further defended the 
l'in on the basis that the plaintiff's claims were barred by 
1 d1 1'ncl1e Annntat•0 d ancl/or because plaintiff 
r1 l1P ,i.n adverse Claim tn a deposit:. ()(" instrument in pOSSeSSiOn Of 
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the Bank but failed to meet the requirements set forth by the 
statutes to restrict the Bank's payment of checks 11rawn againsi 
such deposit or instrument. 
' DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the District Court without a jury. 
Judgement was entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff 
on all claims made by plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmance of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about August 8, 1980, Roger LeFevre, the Chief 
Executive Officer of First Capital Mortgage Loan Corporation, 
opened a general checking account at the Eagle Gate Branch of the 
Bank of Utah located in Salt Lake City. 
4-5] 
[Tr. 406-407; Exhibits 
On August 18, 1980, Research Planning, Inc (hereinafter 
"Research Planning" or "appellant"), a company which provided 
investment services for its clients, [Tr. 353) entered into a 
Real Estate Loan Agreement and also an Escrow Agreement with R. 
K. Buie & Associates (hereinafter "Buie"). [Exhibits 2, 21] 
Under the terms of the Real Estate Loan Agreement, Research 
Planning agreed to loan Buie $260,000 to purchase and develop 
property in Ogden, Utah. [Tr. 353; Exhibit 2) As part of the 
Real Estate Loan Agreement and the Escrow Agreement, Research 
-2-
l'],rnn 1 rHJ and Buie agreed to employ First Capital Mortgage Loan 
'',it icrn (hereinafter "First Capital") as escrow agent to hold 
''h0,000 until final closing of the transaction. 
1Xl1iliits 2, 21] 
[Tr. 354; 
First Capital had a prior lien on the Ogden property, 
which Research Planning wanted First Capital to subordinate, so 
that Research Planning would have a first trust deed securing its 
loan of $260,000 on the property. First Capital agreed to subor-
dinate its lien to Research Planning and signed a subordination 
agreement. [Tr. 354, 358; Exhibits 2, 21, 22, 23, 24] 
On August 18, 1980, Buie executed a Trust Deed covering 
the subject property in favor of Research Planning, with First 
Capital acting as trustee. [Exhibit 26] On the same date, Buie 
executed a note in the amount of $260,000 in favor of Research 
Planning. The note was also signed by Steven F. Alder, and the 
note was further personally guaranteed by R. Kent Buie, Chief 
Executive Officer of Buie, and by Steven F. Alder. [Exhibit 
2 'i I . 
The Real Estate Loan Agreement [Exhibit 2], the Escrow 
Agreement [Exhibit 21], the Subordination Agreement [Exhibit 24], 
the Trust Deed Note [Exhibit 25], and the Trust Deed [Exhibit 26] 
•ere apparently all executed on August 18, 1980, during a meeting 
held in Roger LeFevre's office. Present at the meeting in 
[,.,pµvre's office were Michael Purles, an officer of Research 
ri 'nning [Tr. 352], Roger Lefevre, Merrill Weech (Research 
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Planning's attorney), R. Kent Buie, Chief Executive Officer of 
Buie, and possibly also Steven Alder (attorney for Au1e). [Tr. 
356-357] 
The signing of all the above-referenced documents and 
the consummation of the above-referenced agreements among 
Research Planning, Buie and First Capital was the result of nego-
tiations among Mr. Purles, Mr Buie and Mr. Lefevre carried on for 
in excess of 30 days prior to August 18, 1980. [Tr. 355] 
The Bank of Utah (hereinafter "Bank" or "respondent") 
was not a party to, nor represented at, nor did it have any 
knowledge of, any of the negotiations among Research Planning, 
Buie and First Capital or any of the agreements resulting from 
said negotiations. [Tr. 356-357, 366, 388-389, 439] 
Michael Purles brought a check in the amount of $260,000 
drawn on Research Planning's trust account to the August 18, 
1980, meeting at LeFevre's office, which was the loan amount 
agreed to. The check was probably made payable to First Capital. 
[Tr. 357] Lefevre stated that he wanted a cashier's check 
instead of the trust account check. Pursuant to LeFevre's 
request, Purles agreed to cancel the trust account check and to 
obtain a cashier's check. [Tr. 359] When the meeting at 
LeFevre's office ended on August 18, 1980, Purles immediately 
went to Walker Bank & Trust in Salt Lake City and obtained a 
cashier's check payable to Buie and First Capital in the amount 
of $260,000. R. Kent Buie and Roger Lefevre met Purles at Walket 
Bank, and Purles delivered the cashier's check to them at the 
-4-
[Tr. 359-360] Purles knew that Buie would endorse the 
check to First Capital because First Capital was going 
!"' the escrow agent holding the funds. [Tr. 360-361] Purles 
, I,,,, knew that First Capital would take the check and deposit it 
into its account. Purles knew that First Capital would draw 
dgainst its account and believed First Capital would use the 
$260,000 in accordance with the terms of the loan agreement and 
the escrow agreement. [Tr. 361] 
The $260,000 cashier's check, which was subsequently 
endorsed by Buie to First Capital, was presented by LeFevre for 
deposit to First Capital's general checking account with the Bank 
of Utah on August 19, 1980. [Tr. 426] The deposit was made to 
the same checking account opened by First Capital on or about 
August 8, 1980. First Capital's account was a general checking 
account, or a demand account. [Tr. 429] Roger LeFevre was the 
only required signator to draw checks on First Capital's account. 
[Tr. 429] A Bank is obligated to pay checks drawn on a demand 
account when presented if the checks contain a proper signature 
and there is sufficient money in the account to cover the check. 
Failure of the Bank to make such payment could result in liabil-
ity to its depositors. [Tr. 429] 
Appellant, Buie and Alder were not parties to the First 
Capital general checking account. None of them were authorized 
h1 sign checks on sairl account, nor did they have any control 
"'""' the account. [Tr. 368, 397, 398, 430] After the $260,000 
-5-
cashier's check was presented for deposit at the Bank of Utah, 
the Bank verified the validity of said check hy cnntact1ng Walk•·r 
Bank, the bank which issued the cashier's check, 3nd ily a[,, 1 
verifying the endorsement of R. Kent Buie on said clteck. [Tr. 
437-438] Once the validity of the cashier's check had been 
verified, it could not be returned, and the Bank had a duty to 
pay checks drawn against that deposit in First Capital's account. 
[Tr. 438] 
On August 19, 1980, after the cashier's check had been 
presented to the Bank for deposit, Steve Alder, Buie's attorney, 
went to the Bank and spoke with Roger Barth, Assistant Manager of 
the Eagle Gate Branch of the Bank of Utah. Alder asked if a 
deposit of $260,000 had been made to First Capital's account and 
learned that it had. Mr. Alder was a stranger to the account. 
Mr. Barth had never met Alder before. The only information 
Barth had regarding Alder was what Alder told him, to-wit, that 
Alder was a lawyer and that he said he represented Buie. [Tr. 
4 30 l 
Alder asked Barth to tell him the balance in First 
Capital's account. Barth refused to give this information. 
Alder told Barth that the $260,000 deposit was for a specific 
purpose. Barth told Alder that First Capital's account was a 
general checking account and that checks would be paid from the 
account on a first-come, first-served basis. Alder asked Barth 
to call him if there were any problems on the account, which 
Barth said he would do. Al<ler never tol<l Barth the specific pur-
-6-
,.. ten which the $260,000 was to be used. He did not tell 
"t 11 that the funcls were to be used for a real estate transac-
1 1c>n. He never told Barth that the funds were to be transmitted 
11y r'lrst Capital to a title company, and he never mentioned 
anything about Research Planning's interest in the money. [Tr. 
430-431] In fact, the first time Barth learned that Research 
Planning had an interest in the money was when his deposition was 
taken later in September of 1980, in a separate lawsuit filed 
against LeFevre and some of the corporations he was involved 
with. [Tr. 431] 
The Bank proceeded to make payment of several checks 
8rawn on First Capital's account during the course of the day on 
August 19, 1980. Three of the checks drawn against the account 
were paid on August 19th by cashier's checks issued by the Bank 
of Utah. One was payable to First Security Bank in the amount of 
$66,000, another to National Title Guaranty in the amount of 
$25,500, and a third to Tracy Collins Bank in the amount of 
$80,000. Another check was paid by wire transfer to a company 
called Nature's Estates & Associates, Inc. in the amount of 
$27,500. Some of these checks had been written prior to August 
19th and presented to the Bank of Utah for collection. At the 
of another bank or of a person to whom a check has been 
written, a bank will hold a check for collection if there are 
ir1suff1cient funds to pay the check at the time it is first pre-
;.•ritPd for payment. It is not uncommon for people to write 
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checks before they actually have money to cover them, 
433-434] 
[Tr. 
Late in the aftern<oon of August 19, 1 <J80, a cfH>c-k 1 n t 1 
amount of $250,000 was presented to the Bank f•n payment from 
First Capital's account. The Bank became concerned about the 
account, because there were insufficient funds to cover that 
large of a check. The Bank was concerned because payment of the 
check would mean creating a possible overdraft. Therefore, a 
hold was placed on First Capital's checking account, meaning that 
checks presented to the Bank through normal banking channels 
would not be paid, but that checks drawn on the account would be 
paid upon specific approval by the Bank where the account con-
tained sufficient funds to cover the checks. [Tr. 434, 437, 444, 
446, 447' 449] The Bank was not concerned that Mr. Lefevre was 
misappropriating funds, but that an overdraft might be created. 
[Tr. 444, 446, 449] 
A hold to the extent of $95,500 had been placed on First 
Capital's account prior to August 19, 1980, because the Bank had 
learned that a check in the amount of $95,500 payable and depo-
sited to First Capital's account was going to be returned, and 
would not he available for payment of checks drawn on First 
Capital's account. However, when the $260,000 cashier's check 
was deposited on August 19, 1980, it provided First Capital's 
account with sufficient funds to make payment on the checks whic' 
were paid on August 19th and subsequent thereto. 
The draws made by First Capital on its account 
-8-
.11 "I the $260,000, and it was subsequently learned that First 
'' 'I ""''rl t rinse funds for purposes other than the use for 
1 f1t-->y werf? intended. 
The Bank had no knowledge of the specific use for which 
1 '"' $260,000 was intended, and the Bank also had no knowledge of 
tl1<-' purpose for which First Capital actually used the $260,000 
from its checking account. [Tr. 431, 439, 441] 
On August 19, 1980, when the $260,000 was deposited to 
First Capital's account, no one representing appellant notified 
the Bank that appellant had an interest in the funds, nor did 
anyone from appellant notify the Bank regarding the purpose to 
which the funds were to be put. [Tr. 405, 431] The statements 
made by Mr. Alder to Mr. Barth on August 19, 1980 were made for 
and on behalf of Buie only. Alder never told Barth that Research 
Planning had any interest in the $260,000 deposited to First 
rapital's account. [Tr. 385] Research Planning never made any 
claim against the Bank until it filed suit against the Bank on 
.Jul/ 7, 1981. [Tr. 363-366, 394-396, 447, 455] 
Appellant never presented a sworn affidavit, an indem-
nity bond, or a court-ordered injunction to the Bank to prevent 
thP Rank from paying checks drawn on First Capital's account. 
[Tr. 366, 367] 
The Bank of Utah did not know that the $260,000 was to 
1 1 ... , in a r'?a 1 est a tf? transact i0n. It had no knowledge of 
,111 .. t 11,_, sr>l l"'r nf the pr"perty was, who the escrow agent was, who 
-9-
the title company was, or who may have held liens on the property 
that needed to be satisfied at closing. All information wa· 
available to plaintiff, Rule, and/or Alder, but none of 
information or any documents evidencing such information were 
ever made available by plaintiff, Buie or Alder to the Bank of 
Utah. [Tr. 356-357, 366, 388, 389, 439] 
As will be set forth more fully below, it is 
respondent's position that the Bank had no knowledge that First 
Capital was misappropriating funds it held as a fiduciary. 
Moreover, the Bank did not act in bad faith when it paid checks 
drawn on First Capital's account because the account was a 
general, demand checking account, and the Bank had an obligation 
to its depositor to pay checks drawn on the account so long as 
there were sufficient funds to cover the check. Bad faith means 
dishonesty, and there is no evidence that the Bank acted dis-
honestly. In addition, it is respondent's position that 
plaintiff's claims are barred by Utah Code Annotated §§7-3-50 and 
70A-3-603 because appellant failed to meet the requirements of 
those statutes where adverse claims were made to a deposit or 
instrument held by the Bank. 
-10-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PROPER LEGAL 
STANDARD UNDER u.c.A. §22-1-9 IN RULING 
THAT THE HANK DID NOT ACT IN BAD FAITH 
UNLESS IT ACTED DISHONESTLY. 
Plaintiff's claim against the Bank of Utah is based on 
rrtrth Code Annotated §22-1-9, which states: 
If a fiduciary makes a deposit in a bank 
to his personal credit to checks drawn by 
him upon an account in his own name as 
fiduciary, or of checks payable to him as 
fiduciary, or of checks drawn by him upon 
an account in the name of his principal, 
if he is empowered to draw checks thereon, 
or if checks payable to his principal or 
endorsed by him, if he is empowered to 
endorse such checks, or if he otherwise 
makes a deposit of funds held by him as 
fiduciary, the bank receiving such depo-
sit is not bound to inquire whether the 
fiduciary is committing thereby a breach 
of his obligation as fiduciary; and the 
bank is authorized to pay the amount of 
the deposit or any part thereof upon the 
personal check of the fiduciary without 
being liable to the principal, unless the 
bank receives the deposit or pays the 
check with actual knowledge that the 
fiduciary is committing a breach of his 
obligation as fiduciary in making such 
deposit or in drawing such checks, or 
with knowledge of such facts that its 
action in receiving a deposit or paying a 
check amounts to bad faith. 
Under this statute, a bank can be held liable only in 
two situations. First, if the bank had actual knowledge that its 
depositor was misappropriating trust funds when checks were paid 
<in tt.'3 account, and, second, if the bank had sufficient infor-
m•t1nn sn that its conduct in paying a check constituted bad 
-11-
faith. 
Appellant's statement of the relief sought on arr•e ol anc1 
its points raised in argument clearly indicate thar it d(t·c r,,,1 
dispute the trial court's finding that the Bank of Utah lid no• 
have actual knowledge of misappropriation when it paid 
drawn on First Capital's general checking account. Thus, 
appellant admits it failed to meet the "actual knowledge" burdbn 
of proof. Appellant asks this court to hold that "bad fai:n" 
under Utah Code Annotated §22-1-9 does not mean dishonest I· Li 
order for this court to make such a ruling, it would be 
to overrule prior Utah law and also apply a definition is 
contrary to that applied by numerous other jurisdictions. 
"Bad faith" as used in §22-1-9, was defined by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Zions First Nac.o•al 
Bank, 21 Utah 2d 68, 440 P.2d 869 (1968). In this case, the 
plaintiff had a checking account with Walker Bank. The 
plaintiff's manager, a Mr. Davis, was authorized to draw 
on the Walker Bank checking account with one other requirPd 
signature on the checks. Davis drew 32 checks on plaintil''s 
account making them payable to various payees. The check3 ,,,.r.. 
endorsed by one other individual, not by any of the named 
and were then deposited by Davis into his account at Zions ircc 
National Bank. The checks drawn on the Walker Bank accounc '"''" 
honored and charged against plaintiff's account. 
the money from his account at Zions First National Bank "'"<. c , .. 
verted it to his own use. 
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Plaintiff filed suit against both Walker Bank and Zions 
1t i·rnal Flnnk. The trial court dismissed the claims 
".,.,t '.u:ins '"ith prejudice and plaintiff appealed. Zions 
l•·l•·11'1<"d <in the basis of Utah Code Annotated §22-1-9. Referring 
''' t l1P bad faith standard, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The statute does not define "bad faith." 
However, it defines "good faith" as being 
done honestly, whether it is done negli-
gently or not. "Bad faith" is the 
antithesis of good faith and has been 
defined in the cases to be when a thing 
is done dishonestly and not merely negli-
gently. It is also defined as that 
which imports a dishonest purpose and 
implies wrong-doing or some motive of 
self-interest. (440 P.2d at 870] 
Thus, in order to prove bad faith under U.C.A. §22-1-9, the 
plaintiff must prove that the Bank acted dishonestly. 
The Sugarhouse Finance court also made some very per-
tinent comments regarding the purposes of §22-1-9, as follows: 
The purposes to be accomplished by this 
Act would seem to be to facilitate 
banking and financial transactions by 
relieving the depositary banks and others 
dealing with a fiduciary from the duty 
imposed at common law of seeing that 
fiduciary funds are properly applied to 
the account of the principal. In other 
words, the statute places a duty upon 
principals to use only honest f idu-
ciaries, and gives relief to those who 
deal with fiduciaries except where they 
know the fiduciary is breaching his duty 
to his principal or where they have 
knowledge of such facts that their action 
in dealing with the fiduciary amounts to 
bad faith. 
-13-
. There may be a lot of reasons why 
a principal and his fiduciary may engage 
in odd and unusual check writing, such, 
for example, as making a political 
contribution or putting funds into a 
secret agent's possession to purchase 
property and holcl it in a name other 
than that of the principal. The statute 
was intended to cover just such 
situations. If a principal cannot trust 
his agent with money, he ought to put the 
agent under bond. [_!.£. l 
Thus, the Uniform Fiduciaries Act was intended to limit 
and narrow the liability of banks. The statute is designed to 
place the responsibility for the honesty of fiduciaries on the 
principal. 
The Utah Supreme Court made reference to U.C.A. §22-1-9 
in Movie Films, Inc. v. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., 22 
Utah 2d 1, 447 P.2d 38 (1968), and stated that "the purpose of 
[§22-1-9] is to protect the bank where it allows withdrawals on 
the personal order of a fiduciary who may be breaching his trust, 
unless the latter fact is known to the bank." [447 P.2d at 40, 
Footnote 2] 
Th is court approved the Suharhouse Finance definition of 
bad faith in Braswell Motor Frgt. Lines, Inc. v. Bank of Salt 
Lake, 28 Utah 2d 347, 502 P.2d 560 (1972), wherein it stated: 
There is no suggestion that the bank 
knew of any fraudulent scheme or acted in 
bad faith in its dealings with the depo-
sitor Kendall. As to the meaning of the 
term "bad faith" see Sugarhouse Finance 
Co. v. Zions First National Bank, 21 Utah 
2d 68, 440 P.2d 869 (1968). [502 P.2cl at 
562 J 
Appellant suggests that the Utah Supreme Court's prinr 
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!1nl.I i nqs that proof of bad faith requires a showing of dishonesty 
, "' part of the bank does not comport with the meaning 
,,,Jp<'J tor the term "bad faith" by the drafters of the Uniform 
1 i1J1 i 'r i es Act. Respondent suggests that appellant's argument, 
''l''t this court's reasoning, is erroneous. This court does not 
nPerl to look to the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Act to 
interpret the term bad faith. 
On numerous occasions, this court has set down the basic 
principles relating to statutory construction. In Cannon v. 
McDonald, 615 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1980), the court stated: 
In interpreting the statutory language 
care must be taken to construe the words 
used in light of the total context of the 
legislation, and when the construction of 
a section involves technical words and 
phrases which are defined by statute, the 
provision must be construed according to 
such peculiar and appropriate meaning or 
definition. [615 P.2d at 1270] 
The court need not consider the underlying intent of the legisla-
ture when interpreting a statute unless there is ambiguity in the 
language itself. In State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911 (Utah 
1974), this court stated that "there is nothing to construe where 
there is no ambiguity in the statute." This same principle was 
applied in Matheson v. Crockett, 577 P.2d 948 (Utah 1978), 
wherein the court stated: 
we may look to the intention of the 
legislature when there exists an ambi-
guity in the language of the statute. 
Here we find no ambiguity at all . 
[577 P.2d at 949) 
In the recent case of Utah State Democratic Committee v. 
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Monson, 652 P.2d 890 (1982), this court made the following 
statement: 
Lastly, Huish points out that §20-1-lS 
and §20-3-3 are legislative expressions 
that election laws shall be liberally 
construed to insure persons "full 
opportunity" to become candidates and for 
voters to express their choice. Those 
expressions, however, avail us nothing 
because there is nothing to construe 
where there is no ambiguity in the 
statute. State v. Archuletta, Utah, 526 
P.2d 911 (1974); H--L-- v. Matheson, Utah, 
604 P.2d 907 (1979). [652 P.2d at 893] 
In H--L-- v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907 (Utah 1979), the argument was 
raised that the term "if possible" in a statute was ambiguous. 
This court stated: 
There is no ambiguity in the term "if 
possible" within the context of subsec-
tion (2); and, therefore, there is no 
basis to construe the term beyond its 
literal, plain meaning. [604 P.2d at 
913] 
This court has made it clear, as shown above, that 
reference to the underlying intent of the legislature or drafters 
of a statute is unnecessary when construing the terms in the sta-
tute unless those terms are ambiguous. Sugarhouse Finance looked 
to the express language of the statute to determine the meaning 
of bad faith. Utah Code Annotated §22-1-1 defines good faith as 
follows: "A thing is done 'in good faith' when it is in fact 
done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not." The court 
in Sugarhouse Finance made a logical and reasonable decision when 
it stated that "'Bad faith' is the antithesis of good faith and 
has been defined in the cases to be when a thing is done dis-
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,I I y anrl not merely negligently." 440 P. 2d at 870. The 
, ot the statute is clear on its face. It is not ambig-
J• ,,, , , And there is no need to go beyond the plain language of the 
in defining bad faith. 
However, even if the legislative intent is considered, 
rhe court must "construe [statutes] in light of the total context 
,,f the legislation • Cannon v. McDonald, supra. This was 
done by the Utah court in Sugarhouse Finance where it defined the 
purposes of the Fiduciaries Act, which are to facilitate banking 
by narrowing the bank's liability, and to put the responsibility 
for honest fiduciaries on the principal. The definition of bad 
faith applied in Sugarhouse Finance and approved in Braswell 
Motor Fgt. Lines, Inc., clearly comports with the purposes of the 
statute. 
Respondent notes with interest that nearly every case 
and legal treatise cited by appellant to support its argument 
that bad faith does not mean dishonesty predate Sugarhouse 
Finance and Braswell Motor Fgt. Lines, Inc. Specifically, 
Goodman v. Simons, 20 How. 343 (1857), does not even involve a 
rlaim made against a bank where one of its depositors was a fidu-
ciary. The instant case must be determined within the confines 
•nd context of the fiduciaries statute, upon which plaintiff 
Goodman v. Simons is irrelevant to the instant case 
use it does not involve a similar fact situation or the same 
, I .lt Ute'• case cited by appellant to support its argument, 
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except two, were available to the Utah Surn"'"'' Court at t hP t irnc 
it made its rlecisi0n i:i Sugarhouse Finance and flrdSW<>l l, nw 
court chose to follow the clear language of the as well 
as the intent of the legislature in holrling that bad fdith means 
rlishonesty, and those rlecisions should not be overruled. 
Appellant argues that if a bank remains passive in the 
face of facts clearly suggesting fiduciary misconduct, then bad 
faith exists. However, one of the cases cited by appellant 
belies this very argument. Appellant quotes from the case of 
Davis v. Penn. Co. for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities, 337 
Pa. 456, 12 A.2d 66 (1940), at page 16 of its brief as follows: 
At what point does negligence cease and 
bad faith begin? The distinction between 
them is that bad faith, or dishonesty is, 
unlike negligence, wilful. The mere 
failure to make inquiry, even though 
there be suspicious circumstances, does 
not constitute bad faith • . unless 
such failure is due to the deliberate 
desire to evade knowledge because of a 
belief or fear that inquiry would 
disclose a vice or defect in the transac-
tion, -- that is to say, where there is 
an intentional closing of the eyes or the 
stopping of the ears. [emphasis added] 
Davis clearly indicates that passive behavior on the part of a 
bank cannot constitute bad faith. Davis states that bad faith 
means dishonesty and requires wilful, intentional conduct on the 
part of a bank. 
The Utah Supreme Court is not alone in holrling that 
proof of bad faith requires proof of rl1shonesty. In Board of 
County Commissioners v. First National Bank, 168 P.2d 132 (Wyo. 
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11, 'I , the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the same definition of 
• 11 Ii dS lJtah' s court adopted in Sugarhouse Finance. The 
,,,, 1 '"l court quoted approvingly the following statement from 
v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 
'J9S (1937): 
"'Bad faith' is a general and somewhat 
indefinite term. It has no constricted 
meaning. It cannot be defined with 
exactness. It is not simply bad 
judgment. It is not merely negligence. 
It imports a dishonest purpose or some 
moral obliquity. It implies conscious 
doing of wrong. It means a breach of a 
known duty through some motive of 
interest or ill will. It partakes of the 
nature of fraud." [368 P.2d at 139] 
National Cas. Co. v. Caswell & Co., 317 Ill.App. 66, 45 N.E. 2d 
698 (1942), stated that "Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose 
and implies wrongdoing through some motive of self-interest." 
The New Mexico Supreme Court analyzed the bad faith 
slandard under the Fiduciaries Act in Transport Trucking Co. v. 
First National Bank, 61 N.M. 320, 300 P.2d 476 (1956), and 
stated: 
The sections of the Fiduciaries Act 
mentioned and other sections of the Act 
indicate exculpation or the relieving of 
a bank when it is sought to be charged by 
a fiduciary's principal. The Act provi-
des that the bank may be chargeable when 
its action in receiving the deposit or 
paying the check amounts to bad faith, 
such action of the bank must be wilful 
and even though there be suspicious cir-
cumstances, the failure to make inquiry 
does not constitute bad faith on the part 
of the bank. The purpose of the Uniform 
Fiduciary Act was to facilitate banking 
transactions by relieving a depository, 
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acting honestly, of the duty of 
as to the right of its depositors, even 
though fiduciaries, to check out their 
accounts. [emphasis ddded] [300 P.2d at 
479] 
The New Mexico Supreme Court also quoted approvingly 
from Davis v. Penn. Co., 337 Pa. 456, 12 A. 2d 66 ( 1940), in the 
case of Roswell State Bank v. Lawrence Walker Cotton Co., 56 N.M. 
107, 240 P.2d 1143 (1952), wherein it was stated: 
"The words 'bad faith' are not defined in 
the act, but Section l(a), 20 P.S. 
§33ll(l)(a), states that 'A thing is 
done "in good faith" within the meaning 
of this act, when it is in fact done 
honestly, whether it be done negligently 
or not.' Since 'bad' is the antonym of 
'good,' it follows that a thing is done 
in bad faith, within the meaning of the 
act, only when it is done dishonestly and 
not merely negligently." [240 P.2d at 
1148] 
One of the earliest cases analyzing the Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act was Colby v. Riggs National Bank, 92 F.2d 183 
(D.C.Cir. 1937). The court defined bad faith as follows: 
[W)e think the . • expression, acts 
done with knowledge of such facts as 
amount to bad faith, means, as indicated 
by subsection (2) of §1, acts done disho-
nestly. [92 F. 2d at 194] 
Subsection (2) of §1, referred to by the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court in the Colby case is the definition of good faith. 
It states: 
A thing is done "in good faith" within 
the meaning of this Act [Chapter), when 
it is in fact done honestly, whether it 
be done negligently or not. [92 F.2d at 
188, Footnote 4] 
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The basic definition of good faith is contained in 
111 ih F irluciaries Act. 
v. First National Bank of Nevada, 553 P.2d 955 
1976), cited by appellant in support of its position, in 
requires much more than the passive standard proposed by 
3ppellant. The Nevada Supreme Court stated: 
The underlying purpose of the [Uniform 
Fiduciaries] Act was to facilitate the 
performance by fiduciaries of their obli-
gations, rather than to favor any par-
ticular class of persons dealing with 
fiduciaries. The Act was clearly 
meant to relax the standards of care owed 
by banks to principals and third parties 
when dealing with fiduciary accounts • 
• Liability cannot be predicated on a 
showing of lack of due care, or negli-
gence, because "bad faith" imports a 
moral connotation approximating pur-
poseful or motivated conduct 
(misconduct). [553 P.2d at 958] 
On the basis of the foregoing, respondent respectfully 
suggests to the court that the definition of bad faith applied in 
the trial court as set forth in Sugarhouse Finance, is the proper 
legal standard to be applied under Utah Code Annotated §22-1-9. 
Since appellant readily admits that it cannot meet the burden of 
proof to show dishonest conduct on the part of respondent, this 
court should affirm the decision of the lower court. 
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POINT I I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OP FACT rHA'r 
rHE 1-lANK Dl D NOT HAVE ACTUAL KNOWU:IJGI:: OP 
MISAPPROPRIATION AND DID NOT ACT IN BAD 
PAITH ARC SIJPPORTfoD 1-lY THI:: r:VlDr:NCE AND 
SHOULD NOT Bl:: DISTURBED ON APPEAL. 
Appellant does not dispute in its brief the trial 
court's findinq that the Bank paid out checks on First Capital'; 
account without actual knowledge of misappropriation. "Actual 
knowledge," as used in U.C.A. §22-1-9 was defined in Colby v. 
Riggs National Bank, supra, as follows: 
In Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Jirard Trust 
Co., 307 Pa. 488, 161 A. 865, 867, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania construed 
the expression, "actual knowledge of 
breach of his obligation as fiduciary" 
-- to be the equivalent of --
misappropriation. Thus wherever the 
words appear in the Act they are to be 
read to mean, actual knowledge of 
misappropriation. 
[I]t is obvious that in the use 
of the words "actual knowledge" Congress 
meant to change the rule previously 
applied in many courts, of constructive 
or implied or imputed knowledge, and we 
think there can be no doubt that there is 
a marked distinction between actual 
knowledge and constructive or implied 
knowledge. The former consists in 
expressed information of a fact. [92 
F.2d at 194) 
In Trenton Trust Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 599 S.W.2d 481 
(.'10. 1980), the court stated that "'actual knowledge' of a breach 
of fiduciary obligation in this context has been defined to mean 
the 'present awareness' that such a breach is taking place." 
[599 s.w. at 491) 
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Thus, in order to prove that respondent had actual 
"l•0 •h;e of misappropriation, the evidence would need to show 
i><' 11ank was presently aware that First Capital was 
•I, 111pr•ipriating monies it held as a fiduciary for appellant at 
1 time the Bank paid checks drawn on First Capital's account. 
The evidence clearly does not show this. As set forth in 
respondent's Statement of Facts, when the Bank paid checks drawn 
on First Capital's account after the deposit of the $260,000 
check, the only thing the Bank knew was that a $260,000 cashier's 
check had been deposited to First Capital's general, demand 
checking account; that a person (Mr. Alder) claiming to be the 
attorney for Buie asserted that the $260,000 was to be used for a 
opecif ic purpose; and that the Bank owed an obligation to its 
depositor to pay checks drawn on the account when there was suf-
ficient funds available to make payment. The Bank had no 
knowledge of the terms of the real estate loan from Research 
Planning to Buie. The Bank had no knowledge of the terms of the 
Escrow Agreement among Research Planning, Buie and First Capital. 
The Bank did not know that the $260,000 was to be used to 
purchase real estate. The Bank did not know any of the details 
the real estate transaction. Even if the Bank had known that 
the money was to be used for a real estate transaction, when it 
paid checks drawn on First Capital's account, it could not have 
known that those checks were being used for an improper purpose. 
;Pveral of the checks were payable to other banks. One check 
•µnt t0 a title company. Such payments are clearly within the 
-23-
scope of a normal real estate transaction. Plaintiff's attornc'/ 
Merrill Weech, testified that it is not uncommon for several 
checks to be drawn payable to various parties at the closing of 
real estate transaction. [Tr. 453] 
Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support the 
trial court's finding that the Bank paid the checks drawn on the 
First Capital account without actual knowledge of 
misappropriation. The trial court's finding that the Bank did 
not act in bad faith when it paid checks drawn on First Capital's 
account is also supported by the evidence. As set forth in Point 
I, supra, in order to prove bad faith under Utah Code Annotated 
§22-1-9, the evidence must show that the Bank acted dishonestly. 
Not only does the evidence show that the Bank did not act dis-
honestly, but appellant admitted in closing argument that the 
Bank did not act dishonestly. [Tr. 461-464] This court will not 
reverse the trial court's findings of fact so long as they are 
supported by substantial or sufficient evidence and unless they 
are clearly erroneous or are clearly against the weight of the 
evidence. See Erickson v. Beardall, 20 Utah 2d 287, 437 P.2d 210 
(1968); Nunley vs. Walker, 13 Utah 2d 105, 369 P.2d 117 (1962); 
Knight v. Leigh, 619 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980); Garcia v. 
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982); Kinkella v. Baugh, 
P.2d (Utah 1983), No. 17967, filed March 7, 1983. Since 
the trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial 
evidence and are not clearly erroneous nor clearly against the 
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ot the evidence, the findings should not be disturbed on 
'I, an<l the judgment should be affirmed. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT 
THE BANK OF UTAH IS NOT LIABLE TO RESEARCH 
PLANNING EVEN UNDER THE BAD FAITH STANDARD 
ESPOUSED BY RESEARCH PLANNING. 
Even if this court were to interpret bad faith to 
require proof of something less than dishonesty, the evidence is 
still inadequate, as a matter of law, to prove bad faith on the 
part of respondent. Appellant relies heavily on the case of 
Trenton Trust Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 599 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. 1980), 
in support of its argument that bad faith means something less 
than dishonesty. In Trenton Trust Co., a Mrs. Hook was appointed 
guardian of the estates of her two minor children, which estates 
were funded with monies obtained from the proceeds of a life 
insurance policy on the father of the children, which benefits 
were paid to the children when the father died. Since the 
children were still under the age of majority at that time, their 
was appointed guardian. Two checks of approximately 
$12,000 were issued by the life insurance company payable to Mrs. 
Hook as guardian for each of the children, respectively. Mrs. 
Hook took these checks to the Trenton Trust Company to invest 
them. She showed the checks to a Mr. Patterson, an officer of 
the trust company. He told Mrs. Hook to endorse the checks in 
t l1e ,,xact same language as they were made payable. This she did. 
11,, then invested $11,000 of each check in money market cer-
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tificates. He personally saw both checks and Mrs. Honk's 
endorsements on both checks as guardian. However, when the 
tificates of deposit were issued, also under Mr. Patterson's 
signature, the owners were shown to be Mrs. Hook and each respe' 
tive child. No indication was made that the certificates of 
deposit were held by Mrs. Hook as guardian only. 
A few months later, Mrs. Hook and her new husband went 
to the same Mr. Patterson at the Trenton Trust Company to obtain 
a loan. He suggested to them that the certificates of deposit 
could be used as collateral for the loan. 
certificates as collateral for the loan. 
The Hooks pledged the 
Subsequently, it was learned that the guardianship funds 
had been used improperly, a new guardian was appointed, who made 
demand on the Trenton Trust Company for a return of the cer-
tificates of deposit. Trenton Trust Company filed a declaratory 
action to determine whether it could retain the certificates of 
deposit as collateral for the loan. 
Based on the facts as set forth above, the court 
concluded that Trenton Trust Company had actual knowledge that 
the fiduciary (Mrs. Hook) was misusing the guardianship funds. 
The same bank officer not only discussed the guardianship 
situation with and saw the checks made payable to Mrs. Hook as 
guardian, but also issued the certificates of deposit in the 
improper name, and finally handled the application of the cer-
tificates as collateral for loans to Mrs. Hook and her new hus-
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The bank officer obviously knew the certificates were 
'"'I 11sed for the benefit of persons other than the children to 
"" 1 he money belonged. Once the "actual knowledge" standard 
""'; 1net, it was not difficult for the court to find that the bank 
iidd sufficient information that it acted in bad faith. The court 
otated: 
Although a showing of knowledge that the 
fiduciary is committing a breach of his 
fiduciary obligations is not necessary to 
prove bad faith, such a showing is 
clearly sufficient to prove bad faith. 
[599 S.W.2d at 492] 
Moreover, the Trenton Trust Company had a monetary interest in 
the transaction because it had made a loan to Mrs. Hook and was 
drawing interest on that loan. The combination of "actual 
knowledge" and monetary interest left the court no choice but to 
find bad faith. 
The facts in the instant case are much different from 
those in Trenton Trust Co. The actual knowledge standard has not 
been met in the instant case. Therefore, the court cannot rely 
on proof of actual knowledge for a finding of bad faith. 
curthermore, the Bank of Utah had no pecuniary interest in the 
Pirst Capital account. In other words, when the Bank paid checks 
drawn on First Capital's account, it was not receiving any finan-
cial benefit. It was simply performing its duty to its deposi-
tor. of the checks paid by the Bank are alleged by 
1ppellant to have gone directly to the Bank to pay loans or other 
1 terns ,)r to act as col lateral for loans. 
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Appellant suggests at pages 20 and 21 of its brief that 
the Bank acted out of a motive of self-interest when it failerl 1 
contact Mr. Alder on August 19 or 20 after making payments on 
several checks drawn against First Capital's account. Appellant 
not only misreads the evidence in this assertion, but it also 
assumes facts that simply are not in evidence in the case. 
Appellant states that "If what Mr. Alder said was true, the 
$260,000 deposit was not intended to cover the advances. The use 
of the deposit to satisfy the advances served to eliminate its 
[the Bank's] customer's debt to the bank and was, therefore, a 
direct financial benefit to the bank." Appellant's Brief at 20. 
The evidence shows that the Bank did not know for what 
purpose the checks drawn on First Capital's account were being 
paid on August 19. Even assuming everything Mr. Alder said was 
true, the Bank had no reason to believe that it was paying checks 
for any purpose other than the purpose for which they were 
intended. It did not know who the seller of the property was. 
It did not know where the property was. It did not know who may 
have held liens on the property or who the title company handling 
the closing was. Appellant assumes that on the basis of the sta-
tement by Mr. Alder that the $260,000 was to be used for a spe-
cific purpose, the Bank immediately is to become a detective and 
find out whether every check drawn against First Capital's 
account was for that specific purpose. This is simply not the 
Bank's obligation. See Point I, supra. 
Appellant also fails to appreciate the position the Bani 
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in. This was a general checking account. It was a demand 
,u,1 It was not a trust account. The Bank and First Capital 
re in the position of debtor and creditor. The Bank was 
111uetJted to First Capital, not vice versa, as appellant suggests. 
The Bank was obligated to pay checks drawn on First Capital's 
account on a first-come, first-served basis so long as sufficient 
funds were in the account to make payment. Mr. Barth made this 
very clear to Mr. Alder when they spoke on August 19. Although 
appellant suggests that Mr. Barth was to take everything Alder 
said at face value, appellant also seems to be arguing that Alder 
was not required to believe anything Barth said, if we are to 
accept appellant's version. It would have been a very easy 
matter for Alder or appellant to provide the Bank with copies of 
all relevant documents setting forth the nature of the escrow and 
the obligations of First Capital. This they failed to do. As 
indicated under Point I, the Bank had no obligation to make 
inquiry simply because there may have been some suspicious cir-
cumstances. The evidence makes very clear, however, that the 
Bank's concern was not that First Capital was misappropriating 
trust funds, but that an overdraft might occur in the account. 
Appellant further suggests that respondent should have 
held up the payment of checks because of the hold that was placed 
on First Capital's account. However, the evidence clearly shows 
i1at a cashier's check is the same as cash. Failure of the Bank 
'0 pay checks drawn against the $260,000 would have been a breach 
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of the Bank's contract with its depositor. In Rivera v. Central 
Bank & Trust Co., 395 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1964), the Colorado Supreme 
Court stated: 
The relationship between a bank and a 
depositor is of debtor and creditor. 
American National Bank v. First National 
Bank, 130 Colo. 557, 277 P. 2d 951. There 
it was held "that a bank's obligation to 
its depositors to pay out his funds only 
to him are upon his written order." 
It thus appears that a bank cannot uni-
laterally or in conjunction with a third 
person alter the relationship between it 
and its depositor, nor can it unila-
terally or acting with a third person 
change its liability to its depositor. 
(395 P.2d at 13] 
Even in a jurisdiction which has applied a less 
stringent standard for proof of bad faith, such as Missouri, the 
factual basis necessary to prove bad faith has been one not 
easily met. In General Ins. Co. of America v. Commerce Bank of 
St. Charles, 505 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. 1974), a guardianship account 
was involved, wherein the guardian drew 25 checks payable to 
himself, signed by himself and drawn against the guardianship 
account. Some of the checks contained notations stating that 
they were in payment of services rendered by him to the guardian 
estate. The court stated that bad faith could be proved by a 
showing that "it is 'commercially' unjustifiable for the (bank) 
to disregard or refuse to learn facts readily available." In 
spite of this less stringent bad faith standard, the court held 
that the bank did not act in bad faith. Moreover, the court 
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indicated that if a trustee draws a check in proper form, the 
"'I' 1s CJbligated to pay the check and to presume that the 
w,t ,,,, is performing his duties properly. 
General Ins. Co. of America, the bank knew that a 
fiduciary account was involved because it was a guardianship 
eccount. But having that knowledge, and also having checks drawn 
hy the guardian payable to himself, the court still refused to 
hold that the bank had acted in a commercially unjustifiable 
manner by disregarding or refusing to learn more facts about the 
situation. In the instant case, the Bank of Utah had only an 
oral representation from Mr. Alder that a fiduciary relationship 
was involved. The checking account itself gave no indication 
that First Capital was holding funds as a fiduciary. Of all the 
checks drawn on First Capital's account and made exhibits by 
appellant to the instant action, only one was made payable to 
Roger LeFevre, and that one was in the relatively small amount of 
$5,000.00, [Exhibits 9-17), and there were sufficient funds in 
First Capital's account prior to the $260,000 deposit to cover a 
SS,000 check. In General Ins. Co. of America, 25 checks were 
made payable to the guardian himself, and still the court did not 
find the bank's conduct to be commercially unjustifiable. The 
[nformation provided by Mr. Alder was simply insufficient to 
require further inquiry by the Bank and even under the commer-
cially unjustifiable standard, the Bank cannot be found to have 
icted in bad faith, as a matter of law. 
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Appellant lists, in paragraphs numbered l thruugh 10, 
items which it asserts show the Bank had suft1cient 1nfnrmatinn 
to prove that it acted 1n bad faith under the Mi.ss<iuri standar,J. 
Brief of Appellant at 18-19. A review of these items will show 
that they simply do not prove what appellant claims. Item 1 is 
that the account was 13 days old. Appellant certainly is not 
suggesting that the Bank should be suspicious of all accounts 
that are 13 days old when paying checks drawn on those accounts. 
Items 3 and 4 simply indicate the bank learned that a $95,500 
check made payable to First Capital and deposited in its account 
was not going to clear and could not be credited as collected 
funds. This is no reflection on the activities of First Capital. 
It is simply an indication that a person or entity who made a 
check payable to First Capital did not have the funds sufficient 
to cover the check. Item 5 indicates that when it was learned 
the $95,500 check could not be collected, a hold equal to that 
amount was placed on the account, so that no payments would be 
made against the $95,500. This was done to avoid an overdraft. 
That hold was not ignored when checks totaling $201,806.15 were 
paid by the assistant manager. There were sufficient funds in 
the account from the cashier's check in the amount of $260,000 to 
pay those checks. Item 6 indicates a second hold was placed on 
the account. This was explained by Mr. Barth. The hold was 
placed on the account because a $250,000 check was presented for 
payment late in the day on August 19, and Mr. Barth knew the 
account could not cover that check. However, on August 20, when 
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,t f'apital's executive officer asked for a $5,000 check, Mr. 
issued that check because there were sufficient funds to 
'''"''r that ilmount. He could not deny his customer access to 
monies held in the demand account. 
In Items 7 and 8, appellant appears to be using the 
information set forth therein to claim that the Bank knew that 
the one purpose for which the $260,000 was intended was not 
being met because checks payable to four different persons were 
issued and drawn on the account. The fact that the $260,000 was 
meant for a specific purpose certainly did not mean that more 
than one check could not be drawn to meet that purpose. Mr. 
did not give sufficient information to Barth to support a 
claim that only one check could be issued for the entire 
$260,000. 
Items 9 and 10 reflect Mr. Barth's concern that the 
account might incur an overdraft, not that Mr. LeFevre was 
misappropriating funds. Mr. Barth simply did not know enough to 
suspect misappropriation by First Capital. It is clear under 
Point I, supra, that more than suspicious activity must be shown 
before a bank must make further inquiries. Mr. Purles, Research 
Planning's officer, and Mr. Weech, Research Planning's attorney, 
both testified that they had no reason to question the honesty of 
'-Ir. Lefevre. [Tr. 361, 453] They certainly had had more 
c'xperience dealing with Mr. Lefevre than had Mr. Barth. Yet, 
Jppellant believes that Barth, a person who had little or no 
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contact with Mr. Lefevre and harl no knowledge of the transacticino 
between First Capital Research Planning, shoulrl automaticall 
suspect Mr. Lefevre of wrongdoing because his account might he 
overdrawn. This is clearly an exaggerated approach to the evi-
dence. The Bank acted honestly and in good faith, and even under 
the Missouri approach to bad faith, there are simply no facts to 
prove bad faith. Therefore, even if this court accepts 
appellant's definition of bad faith, the Bank of Utah is, as a 
matter of law, not liable. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §7-3-50 
AND/OR §70A-3-603. 
Utah Code Annotated §7-3-50 was in effect on August 19, 
1980, when Steve Alder came to the Bank of Utah. Sect ion 7-3-50 
states: 
Notice to any bank or trust company doing 
business in this state of an adverse 
claim to a deposit standing on its books 
to the credit of any person shall not be 
effectual to cause such bank or trust 
company to recognize such adverse 
claimant, unless such adverse claimant 
shall either procure a restraining order, 
inJunction or other appropriate process 
against such bank or trust company in an 
action instituted by him wherein the per-
son to whose credit the deposit stands is 
made a party, or shall execute to such 
bank or trust company a good and suf-
ficient bond, in double the amount 
claimed, indemnifying it from any and all 
liability, loss, damage, costs, and 
expenses for and on account of the 
payment of such adverse claim or the 
dishonor of the check or other order of 
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the person to whose credit the deposit 
stands on its books; provided, that this 
section shall not apply in any instance 
where the person to whose credit the 
deposit stands is a fiduciary for such 
adverse claimant and the facts consti-
tuting such relationship, and also the 
facts showing reasonable cause for belief 
on the part of such claimant that the 
fiduciary is about to misappropriate such 
deposit, are made to appear by the affi-
davit of such claimant. 
The facts of the instant case fall squarely within the 
terms of §7-3-50. Steve Alder asserted an adverse claim to the 
$260,000 deposited in First Capital's account at the Bank of Utah 
on August 19, 1980, during Alder's conversation with Roger Barth. 
Alder told Barth that the $260,000 was to be used for a specific 
purpose. It goes without saying that if Alder had never come to 
the Bank of Utah and made this statement to Roger Barth, 
appellant would never have even filed suit. Alder's statements 
to Barth are the only basis upon which appellant can claim the 
Rank had only information regarding First Capital's fiduciary 
status. 
Appellant admitted at trial that it had not met the 
requirements of §7-3-50 or §70A-3-603, which will be discussed 
below. However, appellant apparently takes the position that 
neither §7-3-50 nor §70A-3-603 apply to this case and that Alder 
not make an adverse claim to the $260,000 by his statements 
Jn August 19 to Mr. Barth. It is true that Alder did not speci-
'ically object to First Capital having possession of the 
''6U,OOO in its account. Indeed, the escrow agreement con-
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templated and required First Capital to hold $260,000. The fact 
that Alder did not object to First Capital's having possession nr 
the $260,000 is not the relevant or critical issue when deter-
mining whether Alder made an adverse claim by his statements to 
Barth. 
The key point is the context in which Alder's statements 
were made to the Bank. The Bank stood in a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship to First Capital. Rivera v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 
supra. First Capital had a general checking account with the 
Bank of Utah. Roger LeFevre's signature was the only one 
required on checks drawn against First Capital's account. It was 
a demand account, meaning that so long as sufficient funds were 
available to cover checks, and the funds had been collected, the 
Bank was obligated to pay the checks. When a deposit is made to 
such an account, from the Bank's standpoint, all funds deposited 
to the account are available to pay checks drawn by the 
authorized signator against the account. There are no restric-
tions as to when, where or how the money can be used. The Bank 
had no knowledge of the real estate loan transaction and escrow 
agreement among Research Planning, Buie and First Capital. The 
Bank knew nothing about the sale of real estate in Ogden. When 
First Capital presented the $260,000 cashier's check for deposit 
to its account on August 19, 1980, except for the large amount of 
the check, it was treated no differently than any other deposit 
made by any other individual or company to a general checking 
account. The Bank harl no reason to bel ioeve that any restrict i'>n-
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werP lo he placed on First Capital's use of the $260,000. 
Into this context came Steve Alder, who told Roger Barth 
,,,1 111e $260,000 was to be used for a specific purpose. This 
,1 3tPment implied that First Capital was excluded from using it 
t11r any other purposes. An adverse claimant to a deposit is 
defined generally as a stranger making claim to the account. See 
First National Bank of Ariz. v. Butler, 82 Ariz. 361, 313 P.2d 
121 (1957). Alder had no contractual rights with the Bank of 
Utah relating to First Capital's general checking account. Alder 
was a stranger to the bank account insofar as the Bank was con-
cerned. He made a statement, which if true, would restrict First 
Capital's use of the deposit and therefore would substantially 
change the normal use of a general checking account insofar as 
the Bank (debtor) and its depositor (creditor) were concerned. 
An adverse claimant has also been defined as "one who is 
not shown on the books of the bank as a depositor." Perdue v. 
State National Bank, 47 so. 2d 261 (Ala. 1950). Alder was not a 
depositor of the Bank, Research Planning was not a depositor with 
the Bank of Utah, and therefore, any claims made by Alder that 
the money was to be used for a specific purpose, were adverse to 
that deposit. 
When Alder made his statements regarding the $260,000 
deposit to Barth, the Bank was placed in a position where it 
either held up payments on checks drawn by First Capital on the 
and faced potential liability to First Capital, or it 
-37-
paid the checks drawn by First Capital and fa,:ced thP potpntial" 
liability to the 1dver''' ,-laim;int if t.he ,1,iv•'1 ,:l.'1m pr,1v"i 1 
be valirl. Sect ion 7-J-SO was enacted tn remedy Just -..;uc·h a 
dilemma. A bank need nut heerl n11tice ot an claim 
a court order restraining the hank is obtained by the adverse 
claimant, or the adverse claimant provides the bank with an 
indemnity bond, or, if the depositor is a fiduciary, the adverse 
claimant provides an affidavit setting forth such relationship 
and facts showing reasonable cause to believe the fiduciary is 
about to misappropriate the deposit. Neither Alder nor Research 
Planning met any of the above requirements of §7-3-50. Their 
failure to meet those requirements precludes Research Planning 
from now asserting a claim of liability against the Bank for its 
payment of checks drawn against the $260,000 deposit. 
In National City Bank v. Continental National Bank & 
Trust Co., 83 F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1936), a Mr. Waggoner fraudu-
lently procured approximately $30,000 from plaintiff. Waggoner 
then deposited the money in a checking account in the name of a 
Mr. Anderson in Continental Bank in Salt Lake City. Waggoner 
a $25,000 note secured by certain collateral with Continental 
Bank. After the deposit of $30,000 to Anderson's account at 
Continental Bank, Anderson advised Continental Bank that he woul1 
purchase the $25,000 note. The hank credited $25,000 towards 
payment of the note, transferred the note and collateral to 
Anderson, leaving a balance of approx1matel1 $5,000 in Anders"n' 
account. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff notified defendant of 
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"11"1wr' '-> fraudulent conduct in procuring the $30,000, A few 
,,,.,, t.his notification, Anderson wrote a check for the 
''"'"'ny SS,000 payable to a Mr. Webster. Continental Bank paid 
'1w _·iie1:k to Webster, thus depleting the entire $30,000. 
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant nearly four years 
itter the above-described transactions were completed. The lower 
'"urt entered a decree in favor of defendant, and plaintiff 
ippealed. In discussing the $5,000 check drawn against the 
Jccount, the Tenth Circuit Court stated: 
This sum [approximately $5 ,000] then 
stood to the credit of Anderson as a 
depositor in the bank and, upon presen-
tation of his check by an identified 
payee, the bank was confronted with an 
embarrassing situation. Although having 
been notified that the money then on 
deposit was part of a fund procured by 
fraud which others claimed, but no proof 
of this claim having been presented, the 
demand was being made by defendant's 
depositor through his check for the 
amount standing to his credit and it [the 
bank] elected to pay its depositor upon 
his tendered check. Whether or not the 
bank is protected in its action in this 
respect is the question now presented. 
The determination must be predicated 
upon the basis of two defenses: First, 
the consideration of a Utah statute; and, 
second, laches on the part of plaintiffs. 
[83 F.2d at 136-137] 
The court then quoted Utah R. S. 7-3-52, which was later 
'"11fied and became Utah Code Annotated §7-3-50, and stated: 
This statute appears to be the embodi-
ment in statutory form of a rule having 
it-; roots in the decisions of numerous 
courts. In Nehawka Bank v. Ingersoll, 
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• the language of the court is as 
follows: 
'DepositR in the bank create between 
it and the depositor, or the person to 
whom the credit for the deposit is 
given, the relation of debtor and cre-
ditor. So, where a bank receives money 
from a person, and gives him credit 
therefor, it is in duty bound to honor 
his checks to the amount of such depo-
sit, and it cannot refuse to honor his 
checks or drafts against the fund on 
the ground that the money deposited 
belonged to some other person, or that 
the title of the depositor to it is 
defective. These are matters in which 
the bank is not interested or concerned 
until the third party who claims to own 
the fund shall proceed to enforce his 
rights.' [l.2_. at 137] 
The court then concluded: 
[T]he statute here involved has been 
enacted for the protection of banks in 
situations like the present by placing 
the burden upon some claimant to a bank 
deposit to take some affirmative steps by 
restraining order, indemnifying bond, or 
affidavit which will serve to protect the 
bank against damages which may be suf-
fered by its depositor through the refu-
sal of the bank to pay. [Id.] 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision in 
favor of defendant. The court also found that the plaintiffs 
were guilty of laches due to their failure to take any af fir-
mative action against the bank until nearly four years after the 
fraudulent transactions. 
In Ginsberg v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 55 
Misc.2d 1052, 287 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1968), plaintiff claimed that 
the defendant trust company had been properly notified of an 
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drlvPrse claim to the depositor's accounts when plaintiffs sent a 
'I'\' ,.f a summons to the trust company. The New York court held 
··•"11rling a copy of the summons did not meet the requirements 
, New York's adverse claims statute, which contains nearly iden-
t language as U.C.A. §7-3-50, and that in the absence of a 
r2straining order or indemnifying bond, or some other legal pro-
cess, the defendant could not be held liable for failing to 
restrain the accounts. 
The conclusion is that §7-3-50 provides respondent with 
a complete defense to appellant's claims in this action because 
appellant failed to comply with the requirements of the statute. 
Appellant did not obtain a court order restraining the Bank from 
paying checks on the First Capital account, and appellant did not 
obtain an indemnity bond for respondent on said account. Even 
assuming that First Capital was a fiduciary for appellant, 
appellant still failed to meet the statute's requirement of pro-
virling the Bank with the required affidavit. Therefore, 
appellant's failure to comply with the statute precludes it from 
obtaining relief from the Bank. See, also Sanders v. First 
National Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa, 292 P.2d 160 (Okla. 1955); 
Ciriello v. East Chester Savings Bank, 343 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1973); 
fletcher v. Bank of Meeker, 376 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1962); Staley v. 
Brown, 146 So. 2d 739 (Miss. 1962); Solicitor for the Affairs v. 
Trust Co., 94 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1949); and Desert Bermuda 
v. Union Bank, 71 Cal.Rptr. 93 (1968), 
Although U.C.A. §7-3-50 was repealed in 1981 with the 
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passage of the "Financial Institutions Act of 1981," it was the 
applicable law as of August-September, 1980, governing the Lran 
sactions involved in this case, and is still controlling as tn 
the issues involved in this case. See Okland Construction Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974). 
Moreover, §7-1-601 of the "Financial Institutions Act of 
1981," sets forth the same basic requirements as §7-3-50, as 
follows: 
Receipt of a notice of an adverse claim 
to a deposit or other account standing on 
the books of any depository institution 
doing business in this state, does not 
obligate the depository institution to 
the adverse claimant, unless the notice 
is given pursuant to an appropriate court 
order, obtained by the adverse claimant 
in a legal action instituted by him in 
which the person to whose credit the 
deposit stands is made a party. Such 
depository institution may also pay the 
adverse claim, if the claimant executes 
to the depository institution a good and 
sufficient bond in double the amount 
claimed, indemnifying it from any and all 
liability, loss, damage, costs and 
expenses including attorneys' fees for 
and on account of the payment of the 
adverse claim or the dishonor of a check 
or other instrument of the person to 
whose credit the deposit stands on its 
books. 
Under U.C.A. §7-3-50, plaintiff's claims are barred. 
Alternatively, plaintiff's claims are barred by Utah 
Code Annotated §70A-3-603, which states, in part: 
The liability of any party is discharged 
to the extent of his payment or satisfac-
tion to the holder even though it is made 
with knowledge of a claim of another per-
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son to the instrument unless prior to 
such payment or satisfaction the person 
making the claim either supplies indem-
nity deemed adequate by the parties 
seeking the discharge or enjoins payment 
or satisfaction by order of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in an action in 
which the adverse claimant and the holder 
are parties. 
The Bank of Utah was a party under the terms of the 
above-referenced statute. The individuals and/or companies to 
whom the bank made payments on checks drawn by First Capital, 
were holders under the terms of the statute, and the Bank of 
Utah's liability is discharged to the extent of payment made to 
those holders even if the bank had knowledge of an adverse claim 
to the proceeds represented by those checks. The bank can only 
be held liable if the adverse claimant either supplied indemnity 
or enjoins payment by order of court. Research Planning met 
neither of the above-referenced requirements, and, therefore, is 
barred from recovery against the bank by §?OA-3-603. 
In French Bank of Cal. v. First National Bank of 
Louieville, 585 S.W.2d 431 (Ky. 1979), the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals applied the policy underlying both §?OA-3-603 and 
§7-3-50. French Bank mistakenly wired $30,000 twice, instead of 
iust once, to defendant to be credited to one of defendant's 
depositors. After the mistake was noticed, a vice-president at 
Prench Bank contacted a vice-president at the defendant bank 
1aquesting the return of the second $30,000 deposit or requesting 
1 hat i r be frozen to prevent withdrawal. French Bank also pro-
m1sed to indemnify defendant if defendant would return the 
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$30,000, but no actual indemnity bond or agreement was ever given 
to defendant. Another of defendant's officers contacted the 
depositor and asked to meet with him, but the depositor sub-
sequently came to defendant bank, contacted an employee who was 
not aware of the request for return of the money, and the deposi-
tor withdrew $30,000 and placed it in another account. The depo-
sitar subsequently became insolvent and French Bank sought to be 
reimbursed from defendant. 
The Kentucky court stated that the adverse claims 
statute would probably apply to this situation, but also stated 
that the policy under U.C.C. §3-603 [U.C.A. §70A-3-603] was 
applicable. The adverse claim statute was a new one in Kentucky 
and the court stated: 
The policy is sound, and with or without 
the new statute, it is appropriate in 
this situation. First National inno-
cently received the $30,000 and made the 
deposit as instructed. Ten days later it 
was informed by one side of a mistake. 
First National could either ignore the 
claim, until protected, and incur the 
wrath of French Bank, or honor the claim 
and subject itself to damages by its 
customer for potential wrongful dishonor, 
a no win situation. The protection was 
not provided, and we agree with the trial 
court that the law in this situation was 
for First National. [27 u.c.c. Reporting 
Service at 1055-1056] 
Thus, the policy provisions under §70A-3-603 are basi-
cally the same as under §7-3-50, requiring a plaintiff/adverse 
claimant to provide a bank with either court order or indemnity 
before it can claim the bank is liable for paying out on deposit; 
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.i<J" 1 nst which it has an adverse claim. Appellant failed to meet 
r"quirements of either §7-3-50 or §70A-3-603, and therefore 
I '1ms against respondent are barred, as a matter of law. 
Moreover, since the requirements of U.C.A. §7-3-50 
• <lllf l ict with U.C.A. §22-1-9, the statute passed later is 
controlling. 82 C.J.S. Statutes §363; Becker Products Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 89 Utah 587, 58 P.2d 36 (1936); Pacific 
Intermountain Exp. Co. v. State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 
P.2d 549 (1957); Bateman v. Board of Examiners of State of Utah, 
7 lit ah 2d 221, 322 P. 2d 381 ( 1958). 
U.C.A. §22-1-9 was first enacted in 1925, while U.C.A. 
§7-3-50 was first enacted in 1929. Thus, §7-3-50 controls. 
U.C.A. §70A-10-103 is a general repealer section appli-
cable to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, of which §70A-3-603 is 
a part. Section 70A-10-103 states: "Except as provided in the 
following section, all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with 
this act are hereby repealed." The "following section," 
§70A-10-104, lists certain statutes not repealed by the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code, but U.C.A. §22-1-9 is not on the list. 
Section 70A-10-103 was enacted in 1965. Thus, to the extent 
is inconsistent with §70A-3-603, §22-1-9 is repealed. 
Definite, irreconciliable inconsistency exists between 
'22-1-9 and §§7-3-50 and 70A-3-603. Therefore, §22-1-9 is not 
·rrntu,lling, and under §§7-3-50 and/or 70A-3-603 appellant's 
'la1m:-; (_1re barred. 
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CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the judgment in favor of 
l•'nt because the trial court applied the proper standard in 
1 '•1·; that proof 0f bad faith under Utah Code Annotated §22-1-9 
1 "'l"1res proof of dishonesty. Appellant readily admits it cannot 
P" "", dishonesty on the part of the Bank of Utah. 
The trial court's findings of fact that the Bank had no 
kn"wledge of misappropriation and also that the Bank did not act 
rl1shonestly or in bad faith are supported by the evidence and 
should not be disturbed. 
Even if this court were to apply a less stringent bad 
laith standard, respondent, as a matter of law, on the basis of 
Lhe evidence set forth at trial, did not act in bad faith and 
cannot be held liable. 
Alternatively, appellant's claims against respondent are 
harred under Utah Code Annotated §7-3-50 and/or §70A-3-603 
because appellant failed to meet the requirements set forth under 
those statutes for asserting an adverse claim to a deposit and/or 
instrument held by the Bank. 
A bank cannot act as a detective for a principal who 
makes the mistake of using a dishonest fiduciary. Utah Code 
§§22-1-9, 7-3-50, and 70A-3-603 are all designed to 
pt >tect banks and to limit and narrow their liability where a 
11 •;iionest fiduciary has defrauded his principal. In today's 
w1.oty where banks are required to handle thousands of transac-
1 111",, much more is required than an oral statement by a total 
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stranger to the bank in order to prove actual knowledge or bad 
faith, or to require the bank to respond to an adverse claim. 
Respectfully submitted this __ 1_._ day of May, 1983. 
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